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Egenis seminar series. Against most philosophers who are interested in creativity, I think there is good reason to want an account of creativity that doesn?€?t tie it to agents or individuals. First, the arguments for tying creativity to agenthood are based on unstable, historically contingent intuitions which are a bad basis for analysis. Second, if creativity is importantly linked to knowledge-production, and knowledge-production is best thought of as a population-level phenomena, then we should develop ways of understanding creativity at the population-level. Third, some arguments for human exceptionalism turn on our capacity to be creative, and I suspect our ability to articulate and critique such positions are marred if we cannot get a non-anthropocentric grip on creativity in the first place: decoupling creativity from agenthood is one way of doing this. In light of this, I present an account of creativity which is non-agential and non-purposeful but, I think, both deserves to be named creativity and sheds light on arguments for human exceptionalism.